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Abstract 
The paper builds upon an adverse selection logic to examine empirically the role of risk 
in firms’ capital structure decisions. We argue that risk is an aspect that is missing in the 
traditional pecking order and that giving risk a role in the adverse selection problem of 
external financing transforms the traditional pecking order into a more general theory of 
debt and equity issuance. The main idea is that asymmetric information about risk 
increases the adverse selection cost of debt relative to equity. This solves the existing 
empirical puzzle that the traditional pecking order performs worst for young small firms 
that, it has been argued, face a more severe asymmetric information problem than large 
mature firms that do issue debt. This paper suggests that young small firms do not face a 
more severe but a different asymmetric information problem. For these firms, outside 
investors know less about the risk of their investments. We find robust and economically 
significant empirical support for an adverse selection logic that conditions on risk. The 
results do not appear to be driven by debt capacity concerns, market timing or the 
omission of conventional determinants of leverage. 
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Forty-five years after Modigliani-Miller, capital structure is still a puzzle. The pecking 
order theory of capital structure for example, one of the most influential theories of 
corporate leverage, has recently fallen on hard times. On the one hand, the theory has 
considerable intuitive appeal. Firms seeking outside finance naturally face an adverse 
selection and hence mispricing problem. In order to avoid mispricing, firms finance 
investments internally if they can, and if they cannot, the argument is that they prefer 
debt to equity since debt is less sensitive to outside investors not knowing the value of 
firms’ investment projects (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
On the other hand, the pecking order seems to work well empirically when it should not 
and seems to not work well when it should. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) show that 
the pecking order is a good first order description of the time series of debt finance for 
large mature firms. But it is argued that these firms should face little asymmetric 
information in capital markets. The pecking order cannot explain why young, small, non-
dividend paying firms, i.e. firms that supposedly should face large asymmetric 
information problems, issue equity. For example, Fama and French (2002) test the 
pecking order and compare it to the main alternative, the trade-off theory. They find that 
“the pecking order model beats the trade-off model: more profitable firms have less book 
leverage”. But they also find that “the less levered nonpayers [of dividends] are typically 
small growth firms” and that “the least-levered nonpayers make large net new issues of 
stock […], even though they appear to have low-risk debt capacity. This is not proper 
pecking order behavior.” Graham and Harvey (2001) and Frank and Goyal (2003) reach 
similar conclusions. 
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There is also a theoretical difficulty. Stein (2003) for example points out that “the same 
basic adverse selection argument that is used by Myers and Majluf (1984) for the equity 
market can be applied to the debt market, to the extent that the debt involved has some 
default risk.” In other words, if debt is not 100% safe, then it is not clear that asymmetric 
information necessarily leads to the dominance of debt over equity as predicted by the 
traditional pecking order.  
We show that these difficulties disappear once we recognize that the traditional pecking 
order assumes that investment risk plays no role in the adverse selection problem of 
external financing. Debt dominates equity financing only if there is no asymmetric 
information about the risk of firms’ future investments. The reverse is true, i.e. equity 
dominates debt, if there is only asymmetric information about the risk of firms’ future 
investments. In between these two extremes, a situation with no adverse selection cost of 
debt and one with a maximal adverse selection cost of debt, we have a theory of firms’ 
issuing decisions that says that firms issue more equity and less debt if outside investors 
know less about the risk of firms’ investments. In other words, knowing less about risk 
increases the adverse selection cost of debt. 
Thus, we claim that there is no empirical puzzle. Young small firms do not face more but 
different adverse selection costs of external financing. 
Our empirical strategy extends the tests of the traditional pecking order of Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) by conditioning on risk. Their tests are 
based on how firms finance their need for external capital. Using statement of cash-flow 
data, we construct a measure of this need, the financing deficit, and analyze the empirical 
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sensitivity of debt and equity issues with respect to the financing deficit having ranked 
firms into risk deciles.  
Linking capital structure to risk has been difficult in the past. The survey by Harris and 
Raviv (1991) shows that the evidence is mixed. Rajan and Zingales (1995), who distill a 
large body of empirical research on the determinants of capital structure into a cross-
sectional model, explicitly exclude measures of risk. Their argument is that traditional 
measures of risk such as size or the volatility of earnings are too imprecise. 
Moreover, the standard argument of how risk affects capital structure is based on the 
classic trade-off between the tax benefits and the bankruptcy costs of debt. The tax-
bankruptcy trade-off however seems unable to explain firms’ capital structures or issuing 
decisions. Graham (2000) and Lemmon and Zender (2001) find that a large fraction of 
firms appears to forgo large tax benefits associated with debt financing. At the same time, 
there is little evidence of sizable bankruptcy costs.  
This paper in contrast shows a strong impact of risk on firms’ capital structure decisions 
using an adverse selection argument that says that being less informed about risk 
increases the adverse selection cost of debt. 
We perform a series of robustness checks to see whether our empirical model is 
mispecified and whether alternative theories of the issuing decision can explain our 
results. We test for correlation of residuals across firms and time, and include time and 
year fixed effects. Then we break the sample into different time periods as well as 
subgroups according to age, size, the market-to-book ratio and whether firms have a 
credit rating or not. We also consider a subsample of firms that, according to their 
unlevered Z-score (see MacKie-Mason (1990)), look like firms with investment grade 
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debt. Finally, we also check if we falsely omitted traditional, cross-sectional determinants 
of leverage. 
The paper relates to the controversy between the (traditional) pecking order based on 
adverse selection and the trade-off theory that sparked recent efforts to combine them 
empirically (see Hovakimian et al. (2001), Lemmon and Zender (2002), Mayer and 
Sussman (2002) and Hovakimian et al. (2003)). A related question is whether there are 
“target” levels of leverage as predicted by the trade-off theory and if yes, what do firms 
do to reach them (see Welch (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2003) and Kayhan and 
Titman (2003)). 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the argument for a 
conditional adverse selection logic. Section 2 develops our empirical strategy. Section 3 
describes the sample and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains the main 
empirical results. Their robustness and possible alternative explanations are analyzed in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
1. Risk and the adverse selection problem of external financing 
To illustrate the argument that a firm issues more equity and less debt when risk plays a 
larger role in the adverse selection problem of external financing, we present a simple 
example. 
The example considers a firm that raises an amount I of outside financing in order to 
undertake a risky investment project. The firm’s issuing decision is subject to an adverse 
selection problem since the outside capital market knows less about the investment 
project than the firm. 
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The firm consists of a single project that needs financing. If undertaken, the project either 
succeeds or fails. There are different types of investment projects indexed by θ. If the 
project succeeds it returns )(θx , if it fails it returns nothing. The probability of success is 
)(θp . Investment projects have a positive NPV, Ixp >)()( θθ . We assume that 0≤′p  
and 0≥′x  with at least one strict inequality. A high θ investment thus succeeds less often 
than a low θ investment but conditional on success, it returns more. 
To raise money for the investment project, the firm issues debt and/or equity. Debt is a 
zero-coupon bond with face value F and equity confers an α % stake in the firm. The 
expected true value of holding debt and equity in a firm with a type θ investment is: 
 )])(()[(),,( FxFpFV −+= θαθθα  (1) 
The investment project succeeds with probability )(θp . In that case its return )(θx  is 
used to repay the debt F. The equity part α is a claim on the firm after the debt has been 
repaid, Fx −)(θ . When the investment fails, both debt and equity are worthless.1,2 
The key distortion is that the outside capital market, when contacted by a firm, does not 
know what kind of investment is being financed. The capital market does not know the 
type θ. The uninformed market is therefore exposed to an adverse selection, or 
mispricing, problem. To overcome the adverse selection problem, we follow Myers 
(1984) who argues that a firm issues “securities whose future value changes least when 
                                                 
1 The example can be easily generalized to take into account existing assets-in-place, inside cash and pay-
offs to debt in the case of failure. The important element is that debt must be risky. Safe debt trivially 
solves the adverse selection problem. It is also possible to place the adverse selection logic in the context of 
a reduced form model of costly external finance along the lines of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Stein 
(2003). These generalizations are available from the authors upon request. 
2 Note that having two possible return realizations, one of which is zero, does not mean that there is no 
difference between debt and equity. To see this, let there be only two types: θ1 and θ2. Since the outside 
investor does not know the type, both debt and equity must be defined over three possible return 
realizations: 0, x(θ1) and x(θ2). Note also that a firm would never issue debt with a face value F>x(θ) since 
this would mean handing over the investment surplus to the outside market. 
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the manager’s inside information is revealed to the market”. On can formalize Myers’ 
argument by focusing on the combination of debt and equity ),( ** αF  whose true value 
is independent of the type θ: 
 θθα    allfor     ),,( ** KFV =  (2) 
where K is an arbitrary constant. When the true value of debt and equity is independent of 
a firm’s private information, then their value does not change when the private 
information is revealed to the market.3 
To characterize a firm’s financing decision, one differentiates (2) with respect to θ and 
obtains: 
 )(
1 *
*
*
′
−
=′− pxpF
α
α  (3) 
Equation (3) illustrates that a firm’s financing choice that is robust to the adverse 
selection problem depends on the nature of the adverse selection. The left hand side 
describes the potential for mispricing debt while the right hand side describes the 
potential for mispricing equity. The potential for mispricing depends on what asymmetric 
information about θ really means. For example, suppose that there is no asymmetric 
information about a firm’s investment risk, i.e. all investment projects have the same 
probability of success, 0=′p . In that case we have 0* =α  in order to uphold equation 
                                                 
3 Myers (1984) informal argument about optimal securities in the presence of adverse selection essentially 
picks an efficient pooling equilibrium in a fully fletched game with an informed principal (see for example 
Nachman and Noe (1994), and also Barclay and Smith (1999) for a discussion). Equation (3) can be 
derived in the context of such a game (available from the authors upon request) but the main insight would 
be somewhat obscured due to technical complications such as having to specify appropriate out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. 
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(3). The firm should not issue any equity since the potential for mispricing debt is zero. 
This is the original pecking order of Myers and Majluf (1984).4 
But one can easily obtain the reverse conclusion. Suppose that there is only asymmetric 
information about risk, i.e. all investment projects have the same expected return (they 
are mean preserving spreads), 0)( =′px . Now the firm should never issue debt, 0* =F , 
because equity is not mispriced.5 
The example motivates the following observations. First, the standard pecking order is a 
special case that is obtained under the assumption that risk plays no role in the adverse 
selection problem of external financing. Second, the standard pecking order is completely 
reversed under the opposite assumption that only risk plays a role in the adverse selection 
problem. Third, linking these two polar cases, the same logic therefore says that a firm 
should issue more equity and less debt if risk plays a larger role the adverse selection 
problem of external financing. 
This potentially resolves the puzzle mentioned in the introduction, namely that the 
traditional pecking order cannot explain why large mature firms issue debt and young 
small firms issue equity. The solution is that young small firms do not face more but 
different adverse selection costs of external financing, the difference being driven by the 
                                                 
4 In their original analysis there is no asymmetric information about risk simply because they assume that 
investment projects never fail. Nachman and Noe (1994) show that in order to obtain the original pecking 
order when investment projects are risky, one needs to assume that the projects’ cash-flows can be ordered 
by a slightly stronger version of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Assuming FOSD essentially 
means that investment projects can be ranked independently of preferences towards risk (see for example 
Huang and Litzenberger (1988)). Nachman and Noe also show that this condition (conditional FOSD) 
excludes the case of lognormally distributed returns which invalidates the option-pricing argument used by 
Myers and Majluf when they argue that debt generally dominates equity in the presence of adverse 
selection. 
5 An early application of the potential for mispricing debt under mean-preserving spreads is Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). They assume that an uninformed outside investor (a bank) knows the mean but not the 
variance of firms’ investment returns. They go on to show that the potential for mispricing debt may induce 
a bank not raise the price of debt despite facing an excess demand for loans. Myers (1984) also 
acknowledges that “if there is asymmetric information about the variance rate but not about firm value […], 
the pecking order could be reversed”. 
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role of risk. An outside investor presumably knows less about the risk of an investment if 
he faces a young small non-dividend paying firm than if he faces a large mature dividend 
paying firm. Hence, the former issue equity and the latter issue debt in order to minimize 
adverse selection costs.  
The remainder of the paper attempts to push the argument further by testing empirically 
such an adverse selection logic that conditions on the role of risk. 
2. Empirical strategy 
This section presents and discusses our empirical strategy. It builds upon the recent tests 
of the traditional pecking order by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal 
(2001). 
Focusing on cash-flows 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) propose a test of the original pecking order based on 
how firms finance their need for external capital. A theory of capital structure based on 
asymmetric information at the moment at which a firm contacts the external capital 
market has a priori nothing to say about the level of debt, or leverage. The starting point 
is therefore the following accounting identity of cash flows: 
 EDCWDIVIDEF ∆+∆=−∆++=  (4) 
A firm’s financing deficit DEF, i.e. the difference between uses of funds (dividends DIV, 
investment I and changes in net working capital DW) and internal sources of funds (the 
internal cash-flow C), must be balanced by external sources of funds, i.e. either the 
issuance of debt DD or equity DE (we follow the definitions of Frank and Goyal (2003); 
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see also Helwege and Liang (1996), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Chang and 
Dasgupta (2003)). 
Since Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) are interested in 
testing the traditional pecking order in which debt dominates equity, they test 
DDEF ∆=  by running the following pooled panel regression: 
 ε++=∆ itit bDEFaD  (5) 
In order to test an adverse selection logic of costly external financing that conditions on 
the role of risk, we employ (5) conditionally by ranking firms into deciles, n=1,2…10, 
according to a measure that proxies for the role of risk, which we discuss in the next 
section, and then run regression (5) separately in each decile n: 
 ε++=∆ it
D
nit DEFbaD  (6) 
The key hypothesis is that we expect to be able to rank the estimated coefficients on the 
financing deficit monotonically: DDD bbb 1021 ˆˆˆ >>>  . Firms in higher deciles issue more 
equity and less since risk plays a larger role in the adverse selection problem in higher 
deciles. 
In addition to (6), we also test to what extent equity is issued to finance the deficit in each 
decile n: 
 ε++=∆ it
E
nit DEFbaE  (7) 
Since (4) is an accounting identity, checking that the estimated coefficients on the deficit 
from (6) and (7) add up to one in each decile, 1ˆˆ =+ En
D
n bb  for all n, is a useful test of the 
accuracy of the cash-flow data. 
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Grouping firm into deciles based on recent asset volatility 
The hypothesis is that the outside capital market being uninformed about firms future 
investment risks drives up the adverse selection cost of issuing debt. We use firms’ recent 
volatility of assets to group them into deciles and argue that the outside capital market 
knows less about the risk of investments for firms in higher recent asset volatility deciles. 
In other words, we expect that when raising external financing, firms whose asset values 
have fluctuated a lot, face a higher adverse selection cost of debt than firms whose asset 
values have been stable. 
We use last year’s asset volatility to make sure that the market “knows” the extent to 
which risk plays a role in the adverse selection problem. Current or even realized future 
investment risk however must be unknown. Otherwise, there would be no adverse 
selection problem in the first place. Using a one year lag also ensures that there is no 
contemporaneous interplay between the issue decision and asset volatility. Using longer 
lags however would weaken the link between the role of risk in the adverse selection 
problem and the current capital structure decision.6 
We construct two measures of asset volatility. The first one consists of unlevering the 
volatility of equity. Unlevering is needed since the volatility of equity mechanically 
increases with leverage. We compute the standard deviation of the daily return on the 
market value of a firm. The market value of assets is defined as in Fama and French 
                                                 
6 There is an issue concerning the overlap or gap between the calendar year used for stock price data and 
the fiscal year used for financial data. This overlap or gap exists for 48% of all firms. We check the 
robustness of our results by using only firms whose fiscal year is the calendar year. The results are 
unchanged. 
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(2002) (see also our appendix).7 If there are less than 90 days of stock price data, the 
firm/year observation is deleted from the sample. 
The second measure recognizes that equity is a call option on the value of firm assets 
with the exercise price being the value of the debt (Merton (1974)). From Ito’s lemma, 
we have 
 
t t
E V
t t
V E
E V
σ σ
∂
=
∂  (8) 
where Eσ  is the instantaneous variance of the rate of return on equity (the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns from CRSP), Vσ  is the instantaneous variance of the rate 
of return on the firm (to be solved for), Vt is the market value of the firm and Et is the 
market value of equity (both calculated as above). 8 The derivative of the market value of 
equity with respect to the market value of the firm in the Merton model is: 
 
21
2ln( / ) ( )t t f Vt
t V
V B r TE
V T
σ
σ
 + +∂
= Φ  ∂   
 (9) 
where Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal distribution 
N(0,1), T is the time to maturity of the debt (we try both 10 and 20 years) and rf is the risk 
free rate (from Kenneth French’s website). 
The Spearman rank correlation between the two measures of asset risk in our sample is 
0.95. The rank correlation is the appropriate measure since we use asset risk mostly to 
rank firms into deciles. Given that both measures give virtually identical rankings, we 
                                                 
7 We also try the definition of Baker and Wurgler (2001), which excludes convertible debt, and also try 
using just total liabilities. The results are not affected. 
8 An advantage of the Merton method is that we can use the CRSP return series that is adjusted for stock 
splits and dividends. 
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only report results using the simpler first measure (see also Jones et al. (1984) for a 
comparison of these two measures of asset volatility). 
Discussion 
Of course, using recent asset volatility to group firm into deciles is only going to be an 
imperfect conditioning on the role of risk in the adverse selection problem of external 
financing. In fact, any measure of asymmetric information will be indirect since 
something that is not known cannot be in the econometrician’s information set. A number 
of reasons however suggest the usefulness of our measure. First of all, it seems 
reasonable to assume that risk plays a larger role in the asymmetric information problem 
that a firm faces when raising financing from an imperfectly informed outside capital 
market, if the firm’s market value of assets has fluctuated a lot. Indeed, we will show that 
that the dispersion of asset risk is higher in higher asset risk deciles. Second, we will see 
that firms in higher risk have characteristics that may reasonably be associated with 
outside investors knowing less about the risk of these firms’ investments. They are 
smaller, younger, have higher market-to-book ratios, pay less dividends, have more cash 
and less tangible assets on their balance sheets. Third, we present evidence that recent 
asset risk does not appear to inadvertently pick up mere bankruptcy risk. And fourth, we 
will show that the traditional pecking order works extremely well conditional on picking 
the firms from the lowest decile. In fact, we will show stronger support for the traditional 
pecking order than the original analysis of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) irrespective 
of size, age or the time period that is being considered. 
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3. Data 
Sample construction 
We study a large, unbalanced panel of all firms from the merged CRSP-Compustat 
(CCM) database from 1971 to 2001. Our sample only starts in 1971 since we mostly use 
cash flow data. We make the following standard adjustments. We exclude financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6999), regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and firms involved in 
major mergers and acquisitions (Compustat footnote code AB). Furthermore, we exclude 
firm/year observations that report cash flows data using format code (item 318) 4 or 6 
(both undefined by Compustat) and 5 (for the Canadian file) or if the format code is 
missing. 
To be able to link Compustat reliably to CRSP data we use only records with link type 
‘LC', 'LN', 'LO', 'LS', 'LU' or ’LX’. A small number of CRSP securities that link into 
more than one Compustat firm have also been deleted. 
In order to remove outliers and misrecorded data, we remove observations for certain 
variables that have missing values or are in the extreme 0.5 % left or right tail of the 
distribution (see the appendix for the list of variables that have been treated this way). To 
ensure that the sample does not contain equity issues due to IPOs, we exclude 
observations for the year in which a firm’s stock price becomes first available in the 
CRSP database. The maximum number of observations in our sample then is 103,351 
firm-years. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics at the beginning 
and at the end of our sample period, 1971 and 2001, as well as for two intermediate dates, 
1980 and 1990. 
Table 1: Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics over time 
Panel A presents average balance sheets and panel B shows the average of the cash flows 
in the accounting identity (4). The key observation is that equity plays an important role 
in financing the deficit. It contradicts the standard argument that most external financing 
uses debt (see also Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama and French (2003)).9 
Note also the difference between the mean and the median of net debt and equity issues. 
The median is zero for both. A typical firm appears to stay out of the market for external 
finance most of the time, but if it does seek external finance, the magnitude of the market 
intervention is large relative to firm size. 
4. Analysis 
The traditional pecking order 
An implication of the conditional adverse selection logic is that the traditional pecking 
order should not be a good description of debt issuance for all firms in the sample. It 
should only work well for those firms that have the smallest adverse selection cost of 
debt. 
                                                 
9 The table confirms that dividends are a disappearing use of corporate cash flows (see Fama and French 
(2001) and also Baker and Wurgler (2003)). A comparison of the average and the median dividend 
indicates that typical firms stop paying dividends and that those who continue paying them, nevertheless 
reduce the amount paid. 
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The result from running regression (6) on the full sample is (pooled OLS standard error 
in brackets): 
 
2 0.36)               (0.000)    (0.002)       (R
ˆ 0.004 0.375it itD DEF
=
∆ = − +
 (10) 
The coefficient on the financing deficit is much less than the 0.75 (R2 of 0.68) reported 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) on a sample of 157 firms with continuous reporting 
from 1971 to 1989. 
Our coefficient is only slightly larger than the 0.28 (R2 of 0.14) reported by Frank and 
Goyal (2003) using an unbalanced panel from 1971-89.10 We therefore confirm the result 
of Frank and Goyal that the support for the traditional pecking order in Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers does not carry over to a broader sample of firms. 
Our interpretation of this finding however is very different. While Frank and Goyal 
interpret it as evidence against an adverse selection logic of capital structure decisions, 
we argue that one cannot expect the traditional pecking order to work for all firms. It 
should only work conditionally, i.e. for those firms in the sample firms that have the 
smallest adverse selection cost of debt. And indeed, we will show shortly that this true 
irrespective of firm age, size or the time period. 
Ranking by recent asset volatility 
In order to apply the conditional adverse selection logic, we rank firms each year into 
deciles according to their asset volatility in the previous year. Table 2 shows balance 
sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics across deciles. 
                                                 
10 The slight difference seems to come from the fact that our requirement about the availability of stock 
price data eliminates a number of small firms from the sample. 
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Table 2: Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics across deciles 
Firms in higher deciles have more cash on their balance sheet whereas differences in 
tangibles and intangibles are small (panel A). As far as liabilities are concerned, firms in 
higher deciles have roughly the same amount of short-term and less long-term debt as 
firms in lower risk deciles. 
Comparing cash flows across deciles reveals a hump shaped pattern for dividends and 
internal cash flows (panel B). We also find that the median internal cash flow in the 
highest decile is larger than in the lowest decile (not shown in the table). 
The average financing deficit of firms in higher deciles increases strongly, but the median 
financing deficit remains close to zero except for the three highest deciles. Average net 
debt and equity issues both increase for firms in higher deciles, although the increase is 
more dramatic for equity than for debt. Their medians however are mostly zero. This 
again indicates that a typical firm is reluctant to contact the external capital market, but if 
it does raise external capital, the size of the intervention is large. 
Firms in higher asset volatility deciles are younger, smaller and have higher market-to-
book ratios (panel C). Profitability and unlevered Altman’s Z-scores (see MacKie-Mason 
(1990)) first increase and then decrease across risk deciles. Firms in higher asset volatility 
deciles are therefore not necessarily less profitable or more likely to go bankrupt than 
firms in lower deciles. Furthermore, there is a larger dispersion of past and, to a lesser 
extent, future asset volatilities in higher deciles. 
To sum up, firms in higher deciles are younger, smaller, have a higher market-to-book 
ratio, have more cash, less long-term debt and issue more debt and more equity to finance 
larger deficits. There is larger variation of asset volatilities in higher deciles. However, 
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there is no clear relationship between asset volatility and tangibility, profits or the 
unlevered Altman’s Z score. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that risk plays a larger 
role in the adverse selection problem of external financing for firms in higher deciles. 
The central result 
Table 3 contains the central result of our paper. It shows the results from running 
regressions (6) and (7) in each decile.11 
Table 3: Financing the deficit across deciles 
The table shows support for our hypothesis. Firms from higher deciles issue 
monotonically more equity and less debt to finance their deficit. 
To illustrate the result, we plot the coefficients on the financing deficit and the associated 
R2 from Table 3 in Figure 1. 12 
Figure 1: Financing the deficit across deciles 
To get an idea of the economic significance, consider the impact of a one standard 
deviation change (9.3% of book assets) from the mean deficit (0.5% of book assets) on 
net debt issues in the lowest decile. New debt issues increase from 0.1% to 8.1% of book 
assets which is about one standard deviation. In the highest decile, a one standard 
                                                 
11 The table reports OLS standard errors. We also computed White standard errors that correct for 
heteroscedasticity. The corrected errors are about three to four times larger. 
12 Note that the estimated intercept is close to zero across all deciles. This suggests that there is no factor 
that is common to all firms in a decile throughout the sample period that could affect the pattern of net debt 
issues. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on the deficit from the net debt and the net equity regression 
add up to one across deciles. This indicates that we are not missing any significant cash-flows. 
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deviation change from the mean deficit increases net debt issues by about a third of a 
standard deviation. 
Note that the traditional pecking order works extremely well in the lowest decile. The 
coefficient on the financing deficit in the lowest decile is 0.87 (R2= 0.85). This is 
considerably larger than the 0.75 obtained by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank 
and Goyal (2003) when they look for the strongest support for the traditional pecking 
order. This supports the argument that the traditional pecking order is a special case of an 
adverse selection logic of external financing that is obtained when investment risk plays 
no role. 
In Table 4 we show the proportion of companies that either issue debt, equity or do 
nothing in each decile.13 
Table 4: Issue decisions across deciles 
The proportion of debt issues decreases across deciles while the proportion of equity 
issues increases. 
Finally, we split the sample into two groups: firms with an S&P credit rating and firms 
without any credit rating. The hypothesis is that there is less of an asymmetric 
information problem for firms with a credit rating. The service provided by rating 
agencies bridges the informational gap between rated firms and the outside capital 
market. Moreover, these firms are scrutinized closely by investors and analysts. Since 
rated firms faces a smaller adverse selection cost of debt, we expect no, or at least a 
                                                 
13 Issuing debt or equity is defined as a change in ∆D or ∆E that exceeds 1% of book assets. There are a lot 
of minor changes in equity due to the exercise of options or the conversion of other classes of stock into 
common stock. 
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weakened, monotonic relationship of the coefficient on the deficit across deciles. Table 5 
and Figure 2 show that this is indeed the case. 
Table 5: Financing the deficit of rated and unrated firms across deciles 
Figure 2: Financing the deficit of rated and unrated firms across deciles 
Overall, the data is consistent with our hypothesis about a conditional adverse selection 
logic of capital structure. For firms from higher deciles, where risk plays a larger role in 
the adverse selection problem, the variation in the financing deficit explains more the 
decision to issue equity and less the decision to issue debt. In addition, the proportion of 
firms issuing equity increases in higher deciles while the the proportion of firms issuing 
debt decreases. Moreover, there is no strong monotonic pattern in the coefficient on the 
financing deficit across deciles for firm with a credit rating, presumably because these 
firms face less asymmetric information problems. Finally, the traditional pecking order 
works very well for firms from the lowest decile. In fact, our support for the traditional 
pecking order conditional on (no) risk is stronger than the original support in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999). 
5. Robustness 
The pooled panel regressions (6) and (7) are the simplest possible tests of our hypothesis. 
We perform a series of robustness checks to see whether the simple model is mispecified 
and whether alternative theories of the issuing decision can explain our results. We test 
for correlation of residuals across firms and time, and include time and year fixed effects. 
Then we break the sample into different time periods as well as subgroups according to 
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age, size and the market-to-book ratio. We also consider a subsample of firms that, 
according to their unlevered Z-score (see MacKie-Mason (1990)), are firms with 
investment grade debt capacity. 
Our conditional adverse selection model of a firm’s capital structure decision is based on 
an informational friction at the moment when firms contact the external capital market. It 
uses a different set of variables than conventional, mostly cross-sectional empirical 
research on the level of debt or leverage that is mostly rooted in the trade-off theory. The 
basic trade-off theory states that the level of leverage is determined by trading off the tax 
benefit of debt against the cost of financial distress (see for example the account given by 
Myers (1984)). Hence, firms with a high present value of tax benefits and/or a low 
present value of distress costs have a high debt capacity (see also the classification in the 
survey by Harris and Raviv (1991)). Rajan and Zingales (1995) narrow the list of 
conventional determinants down to four main variables: profits, size, tangibility of assets 
and the market-to-book ratio. 
More tangible assets support debt because it means that firms can collateralize the debt 
which reduces bankruptcy costs. The market-to-book ratio is usually seen as a proxy for 
growth opportunities that should be negatively related to leverage. The argument is that 
leverage exposes firms to the “debt overhang” problem (Myers 1977). A recent 
alternative explanation for a negative relationship is market timing. Firms with a high 
market-to-book ratio are overvalued and hence issue equity to take advantage of it (Baker 
and Wurgler (2001)). Sales are usually positively associated with leverage. There is no 
clear theoretical foundation but one normally argues that larger firms have a higher 
reputation or are safer so they can borrow more. Profits show up regularly as a negative 
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determinant of leverage. Traditionally this has been seen as the strongest empirical 
challenge for conventional trade-off models of leverage since they predict that more 
profitable firms should issue more debt. More profitable firms have a smaller risk of 
bankruptcy and have more taxable income to shield (see Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Fama and French (2002)). 
In order to nest the set of conventional determinants of leverage from the trade-off theory 
within our conditional adverse selection model, we follow Frank and Goyal (2001) and 
use first-differences instead of levels. Although this increases standard errors and biases 
the estimators towards zero, we nevertheless confirm the standard signs on the 
conventional variables in a regression without the financing deficit on the entire sample. 
We also expect that recent asset volatility should not be added to the list of conventional 
determinants. If recent asset volatility proxies for the role of risk in the adverse selection 
problem of external financing, it should not be a direct determinant of the decision to 
issue debt. If it was, perhaps by inadvertently picking up the probability of default, it 
would belong to the list of conventional determinants of leverage whose roots lie in the 
trade-off and other theories that are orthogonal to adverse selection. 
To see whether our conditional adverse selection model falsely omits the conventional 
determinants of leverage, we add changes of the conventional determinants to (6). Our 
regression in each decile n then becomes: 
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Unless our conditional adverse selection model (6) is misspecified, we expect the same 
monotonic ranking of the estimated coefficients on the financing deficit across deciles 
from (11). 
In the remainder of this section, we show that all robustness checks are consistent with a 
conditional adverse selection logic of capital structure decisions. At the same time, other 
theories appear unable to account for our evidence. The results therefore do not appear to 
be driven by an inability to issue debt due to debt capacity constraints, market timing, 
omitting important determinants of leverage or a misspecified empirical model. 
Fama-McBeth and fixed effects regressions 
In order to address the potential problem of cross-sectional correlation in a pooled panel 
regression, we follow Fama and French (2002) and use the Fama-McBeth procedure 
(Fama and McBeth (1973)). The procedure consists of running a cross-sectional 
regression for each year, reporting the average of the cross-sectional coefficient estimates 
and using the time-series standard deviations of the cross-sectional estimates to calculate 
standard errors. 14 In addition, we also estimate our base model (6) using both firm and 
year fixed effects to control for time and firm invariant unobservable factors affecting 
debt and equity issuance. 
The results of performing each procedure are shown in table 6. 
                                                 
14 We also analyze the autocorrelation in the time series of the cross-sectional estimates. The first-order 
autocorrelation is sometimes as large as 0.8. Sometimes it is statistically insignificant from zero. We 
address the issue by fitting an AR(1) process to the time series of cross-section coefficients on the financing 
deficit and then inflate the standard errors using the information on the auto-correlation. The result is an 
increase of the standard errors by a factor 3 to 4. 
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Table 6: Financing the deficit across deciles: Fama-McBeth and fixed effects 
procedures 
These statistical robustness checks confirm our earlier results. The coefficient of the 
financing deficit decreases monotonically across deciles and the traditional pecking order 
works very well for the safest firms in the sample. 
Including conventional leverage variables 
First we run regression (11) without the deficit on the entire sample to verify that the 
conventional determinants of leverage have the expected sign in our first-difference 
specification. 
 (0.001)                (0.002)                  (0.000)                  (0.004)    (0.000)
043.0074.0004.0029.0007.0ˆ ititititit LOGSALESPROFMTBTANGD ∆+−∆−∆+=∆  (12) 
All the conventional determinants have the expected sign: positive on tangibility and 
sales, negative on the market-to-book ratio and profitability. Although running a level 
regression in first-differences biases the estimator towards zero, all coefficients are 
statistically significant (R2=0.04). 
Next we add recent asset risk by itself to regression (12): 
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Once we control for the conventional determinants of leverage, the amount of recent asset 
volatility by itself is not a significant factor explaining debt issuance nor does it affect the 
estimated coefficients of the other variables (R2=0.04). 
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We are now ready to run (11), the regression of net debt issues on the conventional 
determinants of leverage and the deficit, in each decile. 
Table 7: Regression of net debt issues on conventional variables and the financing 
deficit across deciles 
Table 7 shows that the inclusion of conventional leverage variables does not change our 
estimates of the coefficients on the financing deficit across deciles at all. 
Are the results driven by well known empirical artifacts? 
The descriptive statistics of our sample reveal that firms with a higher recent asset 
volatility are smaller and younger (see Table 2). Firm size usually shows up as a 
significant determinant of capital structure. Moreover, it is often used as a proxy for risk 
(for example in Fama and French (2002)). Size can however capture other effects such as 
bargaining power or reputation that may also be important for outside financing. 
We now verify that our hypothesis about a conditional adverse selection logic still holds 
if we control for firm size by first ranking firms according to size and then by asset 
volatility. To ease the presentation of the results we use quintiles instead of deciles and 
run regression (6) in 25 size-asset risk groups. The results are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Financing the deficit across size and risk quintiles 
Figure 3 plots the coefficient on the financing deficit across risk deciles for each size 
group. 
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Figure 3: Financing the deficit across size and risk quintiles 
Our results do not change. There is a monotone negative pattern of the coefficient on the 
financing deficit across risk quintiles for each size group. 
Note that the negative relationship is stronger for smaller firms (except in the smallest 
size quintile). This lends further support for our hypothesis since we expect more 
asymmetric information about investment risk for smaller firms. 
The standard pecking order still works best in the lowest risk quintile for all size groups. 
Except for the lowest size quintile, the coefficient on the financing deficit is between 0.83 
and 0.87 in the lowest risk group. This does not support Frank and Goyal (2003)’s 
argument that the standard pecking order works less well for smaller firms. It is 
asymmetric information about risk and not size that weakens the support for the standard 
pecking order.15 
Next, we repeat the robustness check above for age. Table 9 shows that the results from 
sorting by age are very similar to the results from sorting by size. 
Table 9: Financing the deficit across age and risk quintile 
Figure 4 plots the coefficient on the financing deficit across risk deciles for each age 
group. 
                                                 
15 Even for the lowest size quintile, our coefficient in the lowest asset volatility group is 0.50 which is well 
above 0.16 found by Frank and Goyal (2003, table 6). 
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Figure 4: Financing the deficit across age and risk quintile 
In each age group we observe the monotone negative pattern across risk quintiles. The 
negative relationship becomes less important with age which indicates that asymmetric 
information about investment risk is more relevant for younger firms. Finally, we see that 
for all age groups, the traditional pecking order still works best in the lowest risk decile. 
In sum, the evidence in favor of a conditional adverse selection logic does not appear to 
be driven by a size or age effect. In fact, conditioning on size and age strengthens our 
results. 
Are the results valid only for a specific period? 
We now examine whether the sample period matters for our results. Table 10 shows the 
results of running (6) across risk deciles in each decade separately. Figure 5 plots the 
estimated coefficients on the financing deficit. 
Table 10: Financing the deficit across deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
Figure 5: Financing the deficit across deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
The monotone negative pattern of the coefficient on the financing deficit across risk 
deciles is present in all decades. Note that it grows stronger as we move from the 70s to 
80s, and from the 80s to the 90s. 
The traditional pecking order works again best in the lowest (or second lowest) decile. 
The coefficient drops only from 0.916 in the 1970s to 0.829 in the 1990s. This is very 
different from the coefficient of 0.15 found by Frank and Goyal (2003) for all firms 
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during the 1990s. Once we condition on risk, we do not find support for the claim that the 
traditional pecking order is driven by the 1970s. 
Alternative explanation: market timing? 
The descriptive statistics also show that firms with more volatile assets in the recent past 
have higher market-to-book ratios (Table 2). A possible alternative explanation for the 
equity issuance of riskier firms then is that those firms time the equity market, i.e. they 
issue equity because they are overvalued (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). 
Our result however was not that firms in higher deciles issue more equity per se, but that 
they issue more equity to finance their deficit. In other words, these firms have a 
legitimate need for external capital. If market timing were the main explanation, then 
firms in higher risk deciles should issue equity irrespective of their need for external 
capital. This appears not to be the case. 
Moreover, the median of net equity issues is zero (or close to zero) for all deciles. This 
indicates that a typical firm contacts the equity market rarely. Under market timing, we 
would expect firms in the higher deciles, i.e. those with higher market-to-book ratios, to 
issue equity frequently. Table 4 shows that in higher deciles, more and more firms do not 
contact the external capital market at all. Under market timing, one could also expect 
undervalued firms, i.e. firms with low market-to-book ratios, to repurchase equity. This 
does not happen either. 
There are further indications that market timing cannot account for our results. Firms in 
higher deciles also issue more debt. This is inconsistent with firms’ equity being 
overvalued, unless debt is overvalued too. 
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To be sure that the market-to-book ratio does not drive our results, we rank firms first 
according to their market-to-book ratio and then by asset volatility. Again, we use 
quintiles to ease the presentation of the results in Table 11 and Figure 6. 
Table 11: Financing the deficit across market-to-book and risk quintiles 
Figure 6: Financing the deficit across market-to-book and risk quintiles 
The negative monotone negative pattern of the coefficient on the financing deficit across 
risk groups holds in all market-to-book quintiles. The relationship is stronger for firms 
with higher market-to-book ratios (except for the very highest market-to-book ratios – 
there could be market timing for the most overvalued firms). The results are very similar 
to the ranking of firms by size and age. Again, we expect asymmetric information about 
risk to be more relevant for firms with higher market-to-book ratios, i.e. those firms that 
have stronger growth options. The traditional pecking order again works best in the 
lowest risk quintile for all market-to-book groups, except the highest. 
Alternative explanation: variation in debt capacity? 
Lastly, we consider the argument that firms issue equity because they have exhausted 
their “debt capacity”. 
Theories of debt capacity, or trade-off theories of leverage, are often seen as alternative 
explanations that compete with the adverse selection paradigm that underlies our 
arguments. The basic trade-off hypothesis states that the level of leverage is determined 
by trading off the tax benefit of debt against the cost of financial distress. Another classic 
explanation of debt capacity is Myers (1977)’s debt-overhang problem. Firms with 
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valuable growth options and existing debt face the problem that the return of an extra unit 
of capital raised goes first to the existing debt-holders. The provider of the extra unit of 
capital bears the full cost but is only paid after the existing debt is serviced. 
We now show that debt capacity concerns do not appear to drive the equity issues of 
firms in higher deciles. In a similar vein, Fama and French (2002) as well as Graham and 
Harvey (2001) find that equity issuance by young small firm cannot be explained using 
an argument about these firms having limited debt capacity. 
From the description of average balance sheets and cash-flows across deciles (Table 2), 
as well as the proportion of debt issuance (Table 4), we know that firms in higher deciles 
do issue more debt. Moreover, the level of long-term debt relative to book assets 
decreases across deciles from 30% to 10%. This suggests that firms in higher risk deciles 
are able to issue debt and do not have extreme levels of leverage. 
Neither profits nor the probability of bankruptcy vary monotonically across deciles. This 
suggests that a trade-off between the tax benefit and the bankruptcy cost of debt cannot 
account for the monotonic pattern of debt issuance across deciles. Moreover, we saw that 
asset volatility by itself, when added to the set of conventional leverage variables, is an 
insignificant determinant of debt issuance (equation (15)). Thus, asset volatility does not 
seem to inadvertently pick up variations in debt capacity. 
Moreover, we saw that there was a large difference in higher deciles between firms with 
credit ratings and firms without (Table 3 and Figure 2). If firms in higher deciles really 
have lower debt capacities, one should not see firms in high deciles that have a rating 
issuing a lot of debt.  
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To further address doubts about debt capacity possibly driving our results, we rank firms 
first according to the tangibility of their assets, a traditional proxy for debt capacity, and 
by asset volatility. The results of this double sort are presented in Table 12 and Figure 7. 
Table 12: Financing the deficit across tangibility and risk quintiles 
Figure 7: Financing the deficit across tangibility and risk quintiles 
Again, we find the monotone negative pattern of the coefficient on the financing deficit 
across risk quintiles for each tangibility group. The negative relationship is stronger for 
firms with fewer tangible assets. Again, asymmetric information about investment risk 
should be more relevant for those firms. Finally, the traditional pecking order again 
works best in the lowest risk group irrespective of the tangibility of assets. 
Finally, we run regression (6) across risk deciles on a subsample of firms with investment 
grade debt, i.e. firms that should not be constrained by debt capacity concerns. Ideally, 
one would like to use credit ratings to construct such a sample. S&P ratings however are 
only available since 1985 in Compustat and even then, they are only available for a fifth 
of all firms. We therefore select firms that have an unlevered Z-score, a proxy for the 
probability of default, larger than 1.67 (see MacKie-Mason (1990) for further information 
about this modified Z-score). This cut-off corresponds to the median Z-score of those 
firms that do have an available S&P rating of BBB. 
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Table 13: Financing the deficit across deciles for firms with investment grade debt 
capacity 
Table 13 shows exactly the same monotonic pattern for the coefficient on the deficit 
across deciles now on a subsample of firms that appear not to be constrained by standard 
debt capacity concerns. 
5. Conclusion 
The starting point for our analysis is the observation that the traditional pecking order 
seems to work well when it should not, i.e. for large mature firms, and seems not to work 
well when it should, i.e. for small young nonpayers of dividends. This is often perceived 
as a puzzle since it is argued that young nonpayers face more asymmetric information 
than large mature firms (see for example Fama and French (2002)). 
Our argument is that young nonpayers do not face more but different adverse selection 
costs of external financing, the difference being driven by the degree of asymmetric 
information about the risk of these firms, investments. We show that debt has no adverse 
selections costs, which is the traditional pecking order, only if there is no asymmetric 
information about risk. The reverse is true, i.e. debt has a maximal adverse selection cost, 
if there is only asymmetric information about risk. In between these two extremes, we 
have an argument about firms’ issuing decisions based on adverse selection that is 
conditional on risk. 
We test our hypothesis that knowing less about risk increases the adverse selection cost 
of debt by analyzing firms’ sensitivity of debt issuance with respect to the need for 
external financing conditional on having ranked firms into deciles according to their 
recent asset volatility. We show that although recent asset volatility is going to be an 
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imperfect proxy for the role of risk in the adverse selection problem of external financing, 
there is evidence that suggests that our measure is a reasonable and useful one. We use 
two measures of asset volatility. First we use unlevered equity volatility. Second, we 
compute asset volatility using a Merton model. 
The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis about a conditional adverse 
selection logic of capital structure. For firms coming from higher risk deciles, the 
variation in the financing deficit explains more the decision to issue equity and less the 
decision to issue debt. Moreover, the traditional pecking order works very well (in fact 
better than in the original analysis of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)) for firms from 
the lowest risk decile, irrespective of size, age or the time period under consideration. 
A large number of robustness checks suggest that the results are not driven by an inability 
to issue debt due to debt capacity constraints, market timing, omitting important 
conventional determinants of leverage or a misspecified empirical model. 
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
Investments: For firms reporting under formats 1 to 3, it equals Compustat item #128 + 
#113 + #129 + #219 - #107 - #109. For firms reporting under format 7, investments equal 
#128 + #113 + #129 - #107 - #109 - #309 - #310. 
Change in net working capital: For firms reporting under format 1, it equals Compustat 
item #274 - #236 - #301. For firms reporting under format 2and 3, it equals #274 + #236 
- #301, and for firms reporting under format 7, it equals  - #302 - #303 - #304 - #305 - 
#307 + #274 - #312 - #301. 
Internal cash flows: For firms reporting under formats 1 to 3, it equals Compustat item 
#123 + #124 + #125 + #126 + #106 + #213 + #217 + #218. For firms reporting under 
format 7, internal cash flows equal #123 + #124 + #125 + #126 + #106 + #213 + #217 + 
#314. 
Market value of a firm:  Book value of debt = #181 + #10 (or #56 or #130 depending on 
availability and in that order) + market value of equity = number of common shares 
outstanding times the closing share price (from CRSP) 
Variables that are trimmed 
In order to remove outliers and misrecorded data, observations that are in the extreme 0.5 
% left or right tail of the distribution or have missing values are removed. This trimming 
has been applied to the following variables: current assets (Compustat item #4), current 
liabilities (#5), cash dividends (#127), investments (defined above), internal cash flows 
(defined above), change in net working capital (defined above), financial deficit, net debt 
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issued (#111-#114), net equity issued (#108-#115), all as a percentage of total assets, as 
well as tangibility (#8/#6), market-to-book ratio, profitability (#13/#6), and log(sales) 
(natural logarithm of #12). 
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Table 1 
Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics over time 
The table reports average balance sheets for the sample. Financial firms, utilities and companies that could not be 
matched properly with CRSP are excluded. Unless labeled as median, each item in Panel A and Panel B is calculated as 
a percentage of the book value of total assets and then averaged across all firms of our sample in that year. Definitions 
of variables follow Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama and French (2002). See text and appendix for details. 
 
Year 1971 1980 1990 2001 
Number of observations 1518 2925 3481 3810 
Panel A: Balance sheet items 
Assets:     
+Cash (#162) 0.040 0.030 0.085 0.127 
+Short term investments (#193) 0.035 0.045 0.031 0.056 
+Receivables-total (#2) 0.194 0.217 0.205 0.154 
+Inventories (#3) 0.247 0.245 0.186 0.126 
+Current assets-other (#68) 0.014 0.020 0.029 0.037 
+Current assets-total (#4) 0.539 0.575 0.544 0.501 
+Net property plant and equipment (#8) 0.356 0.349 0.320 0.276 
+Investments and advances - equity method (#31) 0.020 0.014 0.010 0.010 
+Investments and advances - other (#32) 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.020 
+Intangibles (#33) 0.036 0.020 0.049 0.128 
+Assets - other (#69) 0.024 0.023 0.054 0.064 
=Total assets (#6) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Liabilities     
+Debt in current liabilities (#34) 0.068 0.066 0.094 0.063 
+Account payable (#70) 0.090 0.114 0.111 0.086 
+Income taxes payable (#71) 0.020 0.018 0.008 0.006 
+Current liabilities - other (#72) 0.061 0.087 0.097 0.118 
=Current liabilities - total (#5) 0.239 0.286 0.312 0.274 
+Long-term debt - total (#9) 0.199 0.200 0.192 0.184 
+Liabilities - other (#75) 0.012 0.015 0.034 0.045 
+Deferred taxes and ITC (#35) 0.020 0.026 0.020 0.016 
+Minority interest (#38) 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 
=Liabilities - total (#181) 0.476 0.529 0.564 0.524 
+Preferred stock - carrying value (#130) 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.021 
+Common equity - total (#60) 0.513 0.461 0.422 0.456 
=Stockholders' equity - total (#216)=(#130)+(#60) 0.524 0.471 0.437 0.476 
=Total liabilities and stockholders' equity  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel B: Corporate cash flows 
+Cash Dividends (#127) 0.018 0.015 0.009 0.005 
+Change in net working capital 0.022 0.024 -0.011 -0.022 
-Internal cash flow 0.099 0.106 0.044 0.000 
+Investments 0.082 0.102 0.071 0.058 
=Financial deficit (Mean) 0.023 0.034 0.025 0.041 
Financial deficit (Median) 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
Net debt issues (#111-#114) Mean 0.012 0.017 0.004 0.001 
Net debt issues (Median) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Net equity issues (#108-#115)  (Mean) 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.040 
Net equity issues (Median) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Panel C: Other descriptive statistics 
Age (years since first appearance in CRSP) 7 11 12 13 
Market value of assets (in millions of dollars) 503.233 464.232 966.102 2943.950 
Book value of assets (#6) (in millions of dollars) 436.892 514.434 858.079 1550.136 
Tangibility (#8/#6) 0.356 0.349 0.320 0.276 
Log sales (log(#12)) 4.73 4.74 4.45 5.25 
Market-to-book ratio 1.52 1.40 1.54 1.90 
Profitability=Operating income(#13) /  Assets(/#6) 0.128 0.144 0.065 0.014 
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Table2 
Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics across deciles 
The table reports average balance sheets, cash flow items and other descriptive statistics for each asset volatility decile. Firms are ranked in deciles according to the daily standard 
deviation of the return on market value of assets (book value of debt + market value of equity) in the previous calendar year. Rank 10 firms have highest standard deviation. Unless 
labeled as median, each item is calculated as a percentage of the book value of total assets and then averaged across all firms in a decile. Definitions of variables follow Frank and 
Goyal (2003) and Fama and French (2002). See text and appendix for details. Z-score equals 3.3*(#170, pretax income)+(#12, sales)+1.4*(#36, retained earnings)+1.2*[(#4, 
current assets)-(#5, current liabilities)]/(#6, assets) (see MacKie-Mason (1990)). 
 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Number of observations 10348 10331 10340 10332 10336 10335 10338 10334 10337 10320 
 
Panel A: Balance sheet items 
Assets:           
+Cash (#162) 0.039 0.034 0.039 0.045 0.051 0.064 0.076 0.091 0.107 0.124 
+Short term investments (#193) 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.034 0.042 0.055 0.070 0.082 0.082 
+Receivables-total (#2) 0.182 0.189 0.195 0.197 0.201 0.204 0.210 0.208 0.203 0.184 
+Inventories (#3) 0.191 0.205 0.210 0.208 0.205 0.202 0.195 0.188 0.176 0.157 
+Current assets-other (#68) 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.026 
+Current assets-total (#4) 0.474 0.483 0.505 0.515 0.532 0.551 0.578 0.602 0.614 0.592 
+Net property plant and equipment (#8) 0.369 0.367 0.356 0.351 0.340 0.322 0.301 0.281 0.267 0.268 
+Investments and advances - equity method (#31) 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.011 
+Investments and advances - other (#32) 0.040 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.030 
+Intangibles (#33) 0.052 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.043 0.050 
+Assets - other (#69) 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.051 
=Total assets (#6) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Liabilities           
+Debt in current liabilities (#34) 0.098 0.077 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.074 
+Account payable (#70) 0.119 0.108 0.104 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.100 0.096 0.098 0.106 
+Income taxes payable (#71) 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008 
+Current liabilities - other (#72) 0.090 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.097 0.096 
=Current liabilities - total (#5) 0.321 0.290 0.280 0.274 0.275 0.275 0.277 0.269 0.270 0.285 
+Long-term debt - total (#9) 0.304 0.270 0.239 0.217 0.193 0.172 0.151 0.131 0.112 0.098 
+Liabilities - other (#75) 0.068 0.047 0.037 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.014 
+Defered taxes and ITC (#35) 0.024 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.008 
+Minority interest (#38) 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
=Liabilities - total (#181) 0.724 0.641 0.588 0.550 0.519 0.492 0.466 0.433 0.411 0.410 
+Prefered stock - carrying value (#130) 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.017 
+Common equity - total (#60) 0.259 0.345 0.401 0.441 0.471 0.498 0.524 0.554 0.573 0.574 
=Stockholders' equity - total (#216)=(#130)+(#60) 0.276 0.359 0.412 0.450 0.481 0.508 0.534 0.567 0.589 0.591 
=Total liabilities and stockholders' equity  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Number of observations 10348 10331 10340 10332 10336 10335 10338 10334 10337 10320 
 
Panel B: Corporate cash flows 
+Cash Dividends (#127) 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.004 
+Investments 0.066 0.074 0.081 0.088 0.094 0.097 0.098 0.096 0.093 0.086 
+Change in working capital 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.004 -0.035 
-Internal cash flow 0.075 0.087 0.093 0.097 0.099 0.095 0.085 0.063 0.019 -0.070 
=Financial deficit (Mean) 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.042 0.060 0.085 0.125 
Financial deficit (Median) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.014 
Net debt issues (#111-#114) (Mean) 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018 
Net debt issues - Median -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Net equity issues (#108-#115) - Mean 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.017 0.028 0.044 0.068 0.107 
Net equity issues - Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 
Panel C: Other descriptive statistics 
Age (years since first appearance in CRSP) 13.7 15.3 14.7 13.5 12.1 10.7 9.4 8.3 7.2 6.6 
Market value of assets (in millions of dollars) 2287.082 2206.197 1896.059 1523.325 1307.745 877.455 588.056 400.242 210.674 144.904 
Book value of assets (#6) (in millions of dollars) 2468.440 1726.506 1273.871 883.251 636.009 430.103 257.375 176.327 90.361 62.547 
Tangibility (#8/#6) 0.369 0.367 0.356 0.351 0.340 0.322 0.301 0.281 0.267 0.268 
Log sales (log(#12)) 6.096 5.988 5.797 5.466 5.130 4.726 4.305 3.812 3.181 2.169 
Market-to-book ratio 1.127 1.160 1.256 1.343 1.447 1.582 1.750 1.964 2.213 2.694 
Profitability=Operating income(#13)/Assets(/#6) 0.103 0.119 0.127 0.132 0.132 0.127 0.112 0.083 0.027 -0.088 
Median asset STD in t-1 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.027 0.034 0.052 
STD of asset STD in t-1 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.126 
STD of asset STD in t+1 0.016 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.030 0.020 0.043 
Median modified Z-score 1.797 2.126 2.291 2.369 2.402 2.374 2.278 2.109 1.712 0.658 
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Table 3 
Financing the deficit across deciles 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D and net equity issues ∆E on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile n=1,…10: 
itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ , 
itit
E
nit DEFbaE ε++=∆ . Ranking based on the daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest 
standard deviation. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients, in italics. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable - Net debt issued 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.868 0.822 0.807 0.764 0.708 0.570 0.457 0.326 0.230 0.147 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
           
Adjusted R squared 0.849 0.802 0.787 0.728 0.665 0.542 0.419 0.293 0.209 0.129 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable - Net equity issued 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.126 0.175 0.192 0.235 0.291 0.430 0.542 0.673 0.770 0.853 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
           
Adjusted R squared 0.109 0.157 0.173 0.203 0.251 0.402 0.504 0.638 0.747 0.832 
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Figure 1 
Financing the deficit across deciles 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D and net equity issues ∆E on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile n=1,…10: itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ , 
itit
E
nit DEFbaE ε++=∆ .The figure plots coefficients on financial deficit and adjusted R-squared for each decile. 
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Table 4 
Issue decisions across deciles 
The table reports data on financing choices. ‘-‘ denotes net issues of debt/equity less than -1% of total assets (repurchases); ‘0’ denotes net issues of debt/equity between   -1% and 
1% of total assets; ‘+’ denotes net issues of debt/equity larger than 1% of total assets (significant outside financing). This produces 3x3=9 financing patterns. The table reports 
proportion of firms in each decile (in %) that follows a particular financing pattern. For example, the upper left corner cell shows that 3.28% of all firms in decile 1 (safe firms) 
repurchased more than 1% of total assets worth of both debt and equity. Ranking based on the daily standard deviation of market value of assets during the previous calendar year. 
 
Debt Equity 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
- - 3.28 4.54 4.88 4.21 3.79 3.43 2.85 2.46 1.78 0.97 
0 - 2.33 4.45 5.02 5.49 5.4 5.37 5.61 4.87 4.26 3.34 
+ - 3.02 5.61 6.03 5.27 4.14 3.22 2.79 2.2 1.6 1.07 
- 0 31.67 29.33 26.01 24.76 23.29 21.33 19.9 16.6 15.71 13.24 
0 0 20.6 19.06 20.55 20.95 22.09 23.48 22.76 24.09 23.63 26.11 
+ 0 27.39 26.57 25.86 25.54 25.22 23.01 19.7 18.3 16.24 13.75 
- + 4.84 4.56 4.86 5.36 6.1 6.9 7.94 8.99 9.96 11.14 
0 + 2.01 1.67 2.27 3.28 4.2 6.46 10.62 13.84 16.88 19.15 
+ + 4.84 4.21 4.52 5.14 5.76 6.79 7.82 8.65 9.95 11.24 
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Table 5 
Financing the deficit across deciles for firms with and without credit rating 
Firms are split into 2 subsamples depending on availability of S&P issuer credit rating data. Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are 
estimated for each decile in each subsample: 
itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ . Ranking is done for the whole sample based on the daily standard deviation of the return on market value of 
firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients, in italics. All coefficients 
on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
 
 Firms with S&P issuer credit rating data 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.016 
           
Financial deficit 0.877 0.838 0.807 0.794 0.735 0.761 0.800 0.774 0.695 0.577 
 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.030 0.049 0.057 
           
Adj. R squared 0.873 0.823 0.802 0.787 0.738 0.786 0.812 0.719 0.652 0.617 
           
Number of Observations 2822 2943 2380 1783 1186 789 446 253 106 65 
 Firms without S&P issuer credit rating data 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.865 0.813 0.804 0.751 0.700 0.544 0.427 0.306 0.221 0.145 
 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
           
Adj. R squared 0.841 0.794 0.781 0.709 0.648 0.510 0.387 0.273 0.201 0.126 
           
Number of Observations 7526 7387 7960 8548 9150 9545 9892 10081 10228 10253 
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Figure 3 
Financing the deficit across deciles for firms with and without credit rating 
Firms are split into 2 subsamples depending on availability of S&P issuer credit rating data. Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are 
estimated for each decile in each subsample: 
itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ . Ranking is done for the whole sample based on the daily standard deviation of the return on market value of 
firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. The figure plots coefficients on financial deficit for each group and for each 
decile. 
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Table 6 
Financing the deficit across deciles: Fama-McBeth procedure and fixed effects 
Firms are ranked into deciles according to daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets in the previous calendar year. The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ , 
is estimated for each decile/year combination. The table reports in panel A, for each decile, time-series means of cross sectional regression intercepts, slopes and the t-statistic 
using the time-series standard errors (in italics). Panel B and panel C report the coefficient on the financing deficit, and the t-statistic in italics, using fixed year and fixed firm 
effects respectively. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
 
Panel A: Fama-McBeth procedure 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
           
Intercept -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 -6.575 -1.576 -1.129 -1.870 -3.539 -4.089 -5.214 -5.407 -4.827 -3.277 
           
Financial deficit 0.872 0.838 0.821 0.792 0.759 0.668 0.590 0.522 0.423 0.307 
 72.570 56.658 51.779 53.221 32.862 19.494 14.940 10.611 8.537 6.962 
 
Panel B: Year fixed effect 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
           
Financial deficit 0.867 0.819 0.805 0.764 0.708 0.571 0.464 0.338 0.242 0.157 
 243.10 205.03 195.63 166.61 143.28 110.54 87.36 67.40 54.38 40.74 
 
Panel C: Firm fixed effect 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
           
Financial deficit 0.885 0.859 0.840 0.805 0.795 0.670 0.533 0.380 0.274 0.178 
 218.99 183.90 164.54 134.47 130.56 92.39 69.87 48.57 41.02 31.96 
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Table 7 
Regression of net debt issues on conventional variables and financing deficit across deciles. 
The regression ε+∆+∆+∆+∆++=∆ it
LOGSALES
nit
PROF
nit
MTB
nit
TANG
nitnnit LOGSALESbPROFbMTBbTANGbDEFbaD is estimated for each decile. ∆D is net debt issued. Tangibility 
is defined as property, plant & equipment over total assets. Market-to-book is defined as in Fama and French (2002). LogSales is the natural logarithm of net sales. Profitability is 
operating income before depreciation over total value of assets. Firms are ranked into deciles according to daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets in the 
previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients. 
 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
            
∆ Tangibility 0.006 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.056 0.068 0.129 0.101 0.142 0.102 
  0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 
            
∆ Market-to-Book -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
            
∆ Logsales 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.015 
  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
            
∆ Profitability -0.010 -0.017 -0.020 -0.022 -0.045 -0.031 -0.024 -0.040 -0.015 -0.003 
  0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 
            
Financial deficit 0.866 0.833 0.805 0.761 0.706 0.574 0.452 0.328 0.236 0.151 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 
            
Adj. R-squared 0.851 0.814 0.789 0.733 0.678 0.556 0.430 0.312 0.231 0.155 
            
Number of Observations 9893 9996 10046 10023 10043 10032 10040 9959 9869 9559 
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Table 8 
Financing the deficit across size and asset volatility quintiles 
The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/asset volatility group. The table reports coefficients of 
the financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to book assets, and then within each size quintile, firms are 
ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets during the previous calendar 
year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients in italics.   
 
Asset volatility quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 
Size quintile 1 (Small) 0.505 0.309 0.235 0.143 0.127 
 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
      
Size quintile 2 0.836 0.624 0.456 0.291 0.189 
 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
      
Size quintile 3 0.866 0.771 0.676 0.490 0.265 
 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
      
Size quintile 4 0.873 0.821 0.798 0.703 0.519 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
      
Size quintile 5 (Big) 0.839 0.823 0.788 0.750 0.713 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 
Figure 3 
Financing the deficit across size and asset volatility quintile 
The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/ asset volatility group. Firms are sorted in quintiles 
according to book assets, and then within each size quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard 
deviation of the return on market value of assets during the previous calendar year. The figure plots coefficients on 
financial deficit for the size quintiles. 
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Table 9 
Financing the deficit across age and asset volatility quintiles 
The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each age/ asset volatility group. The table reports coefficients of 
the financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to age (years since it first appeared in CRSP), and then within 
each age quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets 
during the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients in italics. 
Asset volatility quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 
Age quintile 1 (Young) 0.771 0.615 0.374 0.250 0.155 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 
      
Age quintile 2 0.841 0.705 0.531 0.292 0.157 
 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 
      
Age quintile 3 0.856 0.785 0.607 0.397 0.180 
 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 
      
Age quintile 4 0.879 0.795 0.703 0.521 0.277 
 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 
      
Age quintile 5 (Old) 0.889 0.844 0.795 0.760 0.504 
 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 
Figure 4 
Financing the deficit across age and asset volatility quintile 
The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each age/ asset volatility group. Firms are sorted in quintiles 
according to age (years since it first appeared in CRSP), and then within each age quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups 
based on daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets during the previous calendar year. The figure 
plots coefficients on financial deficit for the age quintiles. 
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Table 10 
Financing the deficit across asset volatility deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile in each period separately: itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ . Ranking based 
on the daily standard deviation of the return on market value of firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. OLS standard 
errors are reported below the coefficients, in italics. 
Panel A: 1971-1980 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.916 0.838 0.900 0.862 0.887 0.842 0.798 0.788 0.725 0.534 
 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 
           
Adj. R squared 0.880 0.861 0.898 0.848 0.869 0.847 0.789 0.781 0.709 0.504 
Panel B: 1981-1990 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
           
Financial deficit 0.891 0.792 0.824 0.802 0.758 0.720 0.623 0.531 0.356 0.210 
 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 
           
Adj. R squared 0.889 0.765 0.813 0.782 0.711 0.686 0.578 0.485 0.327 0.186 
Panel C: 1991-2001 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
           
Financial deficit 0.829 0.837 0.771 0.717 0.648 0.454 0.337 0.209 0.150 0.100 
 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
           
Adj. R squared 0.804 0.809 0.741 0.667 0.600 0.423 0.298 0.181 0.136 0.089 
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Figure 5 
Financing the deficit across asset volatility deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s. 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile in each period separately: itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ . Ranking based 
on the daily standard deviation of the return on market value of firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. OLS standard 
errors are reported below the coefficients, in italics. 
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Table 11 
Financing the deficit order across market-to-book ratio and asset volatility quintiles 
The regression 
itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each MTB/asset volatility group. The table reports coefficients of 
the financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to market-to-book ratio  MTB ((market value of equity+book 
value of debt)/book value of assets), and then within each MTB quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily 
standard deviation of the return on market value of assets during the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported 
below the coefficients in italics.   
Asset volatility quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 
MTB quintile 1 (Low) 0.880 0.891 0.888 0.774 0.388 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 2 0.903 0.886 0.863 0.797 0.603 
 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 3 0.833 0.801 0.777 0.695 0.476 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 4 0.799 0.684 0.572 0.444 0.292 
 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 5 (High) 0.518 0.261 0.194 0.141 0.099 
 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
 
Figure 6 
Financing the deficit across market to book and asset volatility quintiles 
The regression 
itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆  is estimated for each size/ asset volatility group. Firms are sorted in quintiles 
according to market-to-book ratio MTB ((market value of equity+book value of debt)/book value of assets), and then 
within each market-to-book quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of the return on 
market value of assets during the previous calendar year. The figure plots coefficients on financial deficit for the 
market-to-book quintiles. 
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Table 12 
Financing the deficit across tangibility and asset volatility quintiles 
The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each tangibility/ asset volatility group. The table reports 
coefficients of the financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to tangibility (Compustat item8/Compustat 
item6), and then within each tangibility quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of the 
return on market value of assets during the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients in 
italics.   
Asset volatility quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 
Tangibility quintile 1 (Low) 0.764 0.568 0.271 0.156 0.110 
 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
      
Tangibility quintile 2 0.844 0.743 0.428 0.294 0.132 
 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 
      
Tangibility quintile 3 0.830 0.780 0.691 0.458 0.187 
 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 
      
Tangibility quintile 4 0.855 0.817 0.754 0.567 0.278 
 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 
      
Tangibility quintile 5 (High) 0.866 0.849 0.790 0.685 0.445 
 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 
 
Figure 7 
Financing the deficit across tangibility and asset volatility quintile 
The regression itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/asset volatility group. Firms are sorted in quintiles 
according to tangibility (item8/item6), and then within each tangibility quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on 
daily standard deviation of the return on market value of assets during the previous calendar year. The figure plots 
coefficients on financial deficit for the size quintiles. 
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Table 13 
Financing the deficit across asset volatility deciles for firms with investment grade debt 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile: itit
D
nit DEFbaD ε++=∆ ,  
Ranking based on the daily standard deviation of the return on market value of firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. 
Sample consists of firms with Z-score higher than 1.671. This cut-off value is the median Z-score for companies with S&P Domestic Issuer credit rating of BBB. Standard errors 
are reported below the coefficients, in italics. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Net debt issued 
Decile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Intercept -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.899 0.828 0.822 0.775 0.756 0.676 0.634 0.539 0.454 0.386 
 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
           
Adj. R squared 0.870 0.803 0.780 0.714 0.713 0.630 0.588 0.492 0.406 0.361 
           
Number of Observations 6249 6230 6237 6230 6231 6239 6234 6233 6233 6220 
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